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Abstract
The relationships between politics and religion have always been the focus of Hobbesian 
literature, which generally privileges the theme of the Christian State, i.e. the union of tem-
poral and spiritual power in a sovereign-representative person. This essay presents other 
perspectives of interpretation, which analyze the relationships between politics and reli-
gion in Hobbes’ works by using specifically metaphysical and theological categories – lib-
erty/necessity, causality, kingdom of God, divine prescience, potentia Dei etc. – which allow 
us to reconsider the nature of political power (and the relevance of modern technology for 
the contemporary politics). The core of Hobbes’ argumentation concerns the theoretical 
status of determinism (i.e. the relationships between liberty and necessity) with regard to 
the reduction of «potentia» to «potestas» not only in political philosophy, but also in meta-
physics and theology. In many passages of Hobbes’ works, then, it is possible to understand 
the role of God’s idea in the natural and political philosophy: God’s idea as first cause or as 
omnipotence is only a reassuring word useful to describe the necessary, mechanical and 
eternal movement of the bodies and useful to justify the materialistic determinism in 
anthropology and politics. Body and movement are the necessary fundaments of the uni-
verse which find in itself - without reference to the category of «possibility» in politics and 
in physics - the motives and the reasons of his own structure and function (from causes to 
effects).
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The relationship between politics and religion has always been the focus of 
Hobbesian literature, which generally privileges the theme of the Christian 
State, i.e. the union of temporal and spiritual power in a sovereign- 
representative person, as exemplarily portrayed in the title page of 
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Leviathan. Over the last few decades, however, other perspectives of inter-
pretation have become established, which analyze the relationship 
between politics and religion in Hobbes by using specifically theological 
categories.1 This essay takes the latter direction, and aims at offering ele-
ments to think over the above-mentioned relationship by using two key 
categories of Hobbesian theology – the kingdom of God and potentia Dei – 
which allow us to reconsider the limits of political sovereignty.2
I. Determinism and Divine Prescience: Hobbes against the Theory  
of Liberty
The theme of potentia Dei is found in the long and articulated debate 
between Hobbes and Bramhall on the relationship between liberty and 
necessity.3 The Hobbesian argument is entirely played upon the level of 
1 Cf. L. Damrosch jr., “Hobbes as Reformation Theologian. Implications of the Free-Will 
Controversy”, in Journal of the History of Ideas, XL, 1979, 339-352; R. Polin, Hobbes, Dieu et les 
hommes, Paris, Puf, 1981; B. Willms, Thomas Hobbes. Das Reich des Leviathan, München, 
Piper, 1987; M. Malherbe, “Le regne de Dieu par la nature chez Thomas Hobbes”, in Archives 
de philosophie, LIII, 1990, 245-259; L. Roux et F. Tricaud (éd.), Le pouvoir et le droit. Hobbes et 
les fondements de la Loi, Saint-Etienne, Université de Saint-Etienne, 1992; E. Giancotti, “La 
funzione dell’idea di Dio nel sistema naturale e politico di Hobbes”, in Id., Studi su Hobbes e 
Spinoza, ed. by D. Bostrenghi and C. Santinelli, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1995, 239-258; J. Overhoff, 
“The Lutheranism of Thomas Hobbes”, in History of Political Thought, XVIII, 1997, 604-623; 
A. Pacchi, Scritti hobbesiani, ed. by A. Lupoli, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1998; L. Foisneau, 
Hobbes et la toute-puissance de Dieu, Paris, PUF, 2000; J. Overhoff, “The Theology of Thomas 
Hobbes’s Leviathan”, in Journal of Ecclesiastical History, LI, 2000, 527-555; M. Pécharman, “La 
puissance absolue de Dieu selon Hobbes”, in G. Canziani, M.A. Granada and Y.-Ch. Zarka 
(ed. by), Potentia Dei. L’onnipotenza divina nel pensiero dei secoli XVI e XVII, Milano, Franco 
Angeli, 2000, 269-293; C. Leijenhorst, “Hobbes’s Corporeal Deity”, in L. Foisneau and 
G. Wright (ed. by), Nuove prospettive critiche sul “Leviatano” di Hobbes nel 350° anniversario di 
pubblicazione, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2004, 73-95; A. Herla, Hobbes ou le déclin du Royaume 
des ténèbres. Politique et théologie dans le “Leviathan”, Paris, Kimé, 2006.
2 The following abbreviations have been used in referring to the Hobbes’ works: E = The 
Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. by J.C.A. Gaskin, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1994; C = On the Citizen, ed. by R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998; Cor. = Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Prima De Corpore, in Thomae Hobbes 
Malmesburiensis Opera philosophica, ed. G. Molesworth, London, Joannem Bohn, 1839-1845, 
vol. I; L = Leviathan, ed. N. Malcolm, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2012; LN = Of Liberty and 
Necessity in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, ed. by V. Chappell, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999; Q = The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and 
Chance, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. by W. Molesworth, 
London, John Bohn, 1839-1845, vol. V.
3 Cf. J. Bramhall, A Vindication of True Liberty, 1645; Th. Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity, 
1646; J. Bramhall, A Defence of the True Liberty from Antecedent and Extrinsecall Necessity, 
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incommensurability: nothing in God – not His wisdom, will, goodness, 
might or justice – can be judged by the standard of human reality.4 For 
instance, human justice always implies a law and therefore a contract but 
this is certainly not the case with divine justice, which is not subjected to 
any contract or law. God’s justice cannot be defined as observance of a law 
established by a superior power, because such a power does not exist: thus 
God cannot sin against the law – because He is not subjected to it – and, as 
a consequence, He cannot be unjust. God’s actions are always just simply 
because He is the one who accomplishes them, the sole bearer of an abso-
lutely irresistible might, the one and supreme holder of all the wills of men: 
only a person who holds such might is above any law. In Hobbes, the divine 
attribute of might is thus justified not only at a logical and ontological level, 
but also at a moral level:
The power of God alone without other help is sufficient justification of any 
action he does. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and 
covenants and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are 
counted and termed rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God Almighty’s 
actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be 
measured by human wisdom. That which he does is made just by his doing it: 
just, I say, in him, not always just in us […]. Power irresistible justifies all 
actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it be found; less power does not, 
and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all his actions.5
God cannot sin. First of all, His actions are just because they derive from 
His irresistible might. Secondly, only the one who is subjected to a superior 
law can sin, and this is not the case with God. If so defined – sheltered from 
any accusation of moral irrationality – divine omnipotence involves, how-
ever, two limitations that force Hobbesian argument to stop. First of all, not 
even God can do everything, because this is something impossible in itself, 
i.e. something which is self-contradictory. Secondly, there is another kind 
of things, which are not impossible in themselves, but are rather a conse-
quence of divine decree; all this is incompatible with God’s decree itself. 
The difference between these two kinds of impossible things – the logical 
impossible and the ontological impossible – is also marked by the role of 
being an Answer to a Late Book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled A Treatise of 
Liberty and Necessity, 1655; Th. Hobbes, The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and 
Chance, 1656; J. Bramhall, Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his Last Animadversions in the Case con-
cerning Liberty and Universal Necessity, 1658; Th. Hobbes, Answer to Bishop Bramhall’s Book 
called “The Catching of Leviathan”, 1668.
4 Cf. LN, 21 ss., 28 ss.; Q, 115 ss., 138 ss., 143-144. Cf. also E, §§ I.XI.1-3; C, § XV.14.
5 LN, 22-23.
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God’s will which, in the first case, is inoperative (and could not be other-
wise) whereas, in the second case, it acts precisely to define the present 
order of the world, the only real one because God wants it. Not only is God’s 
might simply not absolute, but it even seems to be subjected to His own 
will; yet to formulate an explicit opinion on the nature of that will is not 
deemed useful by Hobbes, simply because the Divine is unknowable. In 
spite of this, the Hobbesian argument on universal determinism suggests 
that divine will is meant to be necessary. In an anti-anthropomorphic vision 
of God, divine decree must be considered coeternal with Him and coessen-
tial to His nature. Divine will is thus eternal, immutable and necessary. It is 
no coincidence that Hobbes deems it pointless to infer the theological fun-
daments of universal determinism because the theory of divine prescience 
is more suitable to justifying the doctrine of necessity. In Hobbesian 
thought, the relationship between determinism and divine prescience is 
much tighter than the one between determinism and potentia Dei. It is 
God’s prescience, and not His might, to define His ultimate perfection:6 this 
latter idea would then be limited if there were agents freed from necessity, 
i.e. falling outside the range of His prescience. Hobbes sets the issue of 
potentia Dei at a logical-philosophical and not ethical-political level: deter-
minism and prescience build up the theoretical framework for the actual 
ordinate action of God. The absolute action of God is only a theoretical 
model of divine action and relates to the “time preceding” God’s decree on 
the choice of the present order of the world, which, once settled, is eternal 
and immutable, mechanical and necessary, even when miracles are oper-
ated. Hobbes’s discourse on potentia Dei is understood as dealing more 
with liberty and necessity than with omnipotence and miracles; all that 
happens falls within the range of potentia Dei, as it has been foreseen by 
Him ab aeterno. Thus there are not two different ways (ordinate and abso-
lute) for God to act in the world, because universal determinism, through 
the design of divine prescience, is precisely the clearest expression of 
potentia Dei. Hobbes calls it “God’s decree”: all things proceed necessarily 
from His eternal will. God’s decree and prescience are one and the same 
thing with the theory of determinism; they are not two distinct powers in 
God (necessity and will), but rather the same reality – divine action – that 
unfolds in the world through the concatenation of the causal series, 
i.e. through secondary causes. Each event is produced by the convergence 
of many causal chains and the divine decree is precisely their causal 
6 Cf. Q, 18 s., 105, 175 s., 209 ss., 234 s., 246, 423-424, 433.
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connection, as causal chains are always determined by the immutable will 
of God.7 The unconditioned beginning of all causal series is to be found in 
God: so potentia Dei is identified with His being the cause of the mechani-
cal motion of bodies, which has been decided from time immemorial and 
is therefore immutable. For this reason, Hobbesian materialistic and mech-
anistic determinism is more a consequence of God’s prescience than of His 
might.
II. “Potentia Dei” in the Kingdom of God by Nature
At the level of philosophical-political argument, many passages of De cive8 
and Leviathan9 show the theme of potentia Dei in connection with the 
image of the “Kingdom of God”, which Hobbes uses to point out a precise 
series of distinctions among a “Kingdom of God by Nature”, a “prophetic 
Kingdom of God” (which is in turn subdivided into Kingdom under the Old 
Covenant and by the New Covenant) and the “future Kingdom of God”. 
Hobbes immediately identifies the underlying theological-political prob-
lem, i.e. the relationship between might and right in the Kingdom of God by 
Nature: “In the Natural Kingdom God’s right to Reign and to punish those 
who break his laws is from irresistible power alone”.10 At this level, there is 
not any obligation to obey God resulting from a covenant, an alliance, an 
agreement or a contract, but the divine right to rule arises clearly from 
nature. Omnipotence gives God the right to rule and man is accordingly 
obliged to obey him because of his weakness, which generates fear and 
hopelessness. In the “Kingdom of God by Nature”, the relationship between 
God and men corresponds to the concept characterizing the mutual rela-
tionship among men in the state of nature, where the range of natural right 
extends to the whole range of legitimacy for actions considered useful to 
the purpose of self-preservation. Hobbes does not ascribe the features of 
rationality to divine will, because it is a self-determined might: “When we 
ascribe to God a Will, it is not to be understood, as that of Man, for a 
Rationall Appetite, but as the Power, by which he effecteth every thing”.11 
According to Hobbes, if man abides by divine power on the basis of pure 
  7 Cf. LN, 20, 22-23, 41; Q, 12, 102-103, 139.
  8 Cf. C, chapters XV, XVI and XVII.
  9 Cf. L, chapters XXX, XXXI, XXXV and XXXVIII.
10 C, 173.
 11 L, 566.
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might and not of gratitude, this of course must not be considered dishon-
ourable for God; however, it must be noted that such a power has a natural 
basis and that, at a political level, it corresponds to the one deriving from 
the claim ex generatione or ex delictu, and not from ex consensu.12 If God is 
a sovereign whose irresistibility, omnipotence and inscrutability justify 
obligation and obedience, then He is a sovereign by acquisition, not by 
Institution; so He is a sovereign ruling over men in a condition similar to the 
one of the state of nature, in which men live before the foundation of a 
common power. However, Hobbes soon points out that the expression 
“Kingdom of God by Nature” contains an anthropomorphic metaphor it 
would be useful to consider as such, in order to underline the supremacy of 
might as the divine right to rule the world. This right, however, is not enough 
to “rule”, as it lacks “word”, i.e. verbal expression:
God is king of the whole earth; and he is not shaken from his throne if a few 
men deny his Existence or his Providence. God so rules all men through power 
that no man can do anything which He does not want done; yet this is not 
Reigning in the precise and proper sense. A ruler is said to reign if he rules 
through speech rather than action, i.e. if he rules by precepts and threats. In the 
kingdom of God therefore we do not count inanimate bodies or things with-
out reason as subjects (though they are subject to divine power), because they 
do not understand God’s precepts and threats. Nor do we count Atheists, 
because they do not believe that God exists, nor those who believe in God’s 
existence but not in his governance here below; for though they too are ruled 
by the power of God, they do not accept his precepts or fear his threats. The 
only persons to be numbered in the kingdom of God are those who accept that 
he is ruler of all things, that he has given precepts to men and set penalties for 
transgressors. All the rest we should call not subjects but enemies of God.13
The “Kingdom of God by Nature” is built on a juridical foundation that is 
such only in a metaphorical sense, because His “rule”, based on His omnipo-
tence, must never be confused with the “rule” of an earthly sovereign, which 
is founded on a covenant, an agreement and a decree publicly known, 
because explicitly pronounced. It is therefore clear that, although defining 
a virtually all-encompassing range of action over the whole present order 
of the world, God’s might is not a claim to “rule”. God is not submitted to the 
standards of juridical argument, not only because His nature and His 
actions comply with the extra-juridical language of omnipotence not only 
because, strictly speaking, He is not a subject (the only category suitable to 
the specific nature of juridical language), but also because the juridical 
12 Cf. E, I.XI.11-12, II.III.1-2, II.IV.10; C, VIII-IX; L, XX.
13 C, 172.
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dimension belongs radically to the human world of becoming and of insti-
tutions. In God, ruling and governing are not the same thing. As a matter of 
fact, although God governs all the creation as the primary cause of every 
motion, He “rules”, in an analogically and metaphorically anthropomorphic 
form, only over those who believe He is the cause of the world, i.e. over 
those who recognize Him, through an aware deliberation, as the supreme 
entity acting directly in the lower world. To simplify: in the Kingdom of God 
by Nature, the political body does not coincide with the whole of mankind, 
but only with the community of believers who recognize God as king of the 
lower world. Therefore, divine omnipotence is not a legitimate right to rule, 
unless on condition of the voluntary recognition of man.
According to Hobbes, ruling through prescriptions means legislating, 
i.e. to openly proclaim regulations that must be respected by the governed 
on the basis of the original covenant. In order to respect this very tight link 
between juridical and linguistic-communicative dimension, divine laws 
also appear in three manners:14 the rational word (expressed in the dictates 
of just reason, which are condensed in natural law), the sensible word 
(expressed in the immediate revelation through the senses) and the word 
of prophecy (expressed in the display of divine will through a trustworthy 
intermediary). Among these three manners in which God’s words appear, 
the least relevant in Hobbes’s analysis is the one connected with the sensi-
ble word (because it only refers to particular people who had direct access 
to an epiphany of the Divine), whereas the distinction between rational 
word and word of prophecy is crucial, as it corresponds to the difference 
between the “Kingdom by Nature” and the “prophetic Kingdom of God”:15
A twofold Kingdom is attributed to God; which corresponds to the difference 
between his Rational and his Prophetic Word. There is the Natural Kingdom in 
which he rules through the dictates of right Reason. It is a universal kingdom 
over all who acknowledge the divine power because of the rational nature 
which is common to all. And there is the Prophetic Kingdom, where too he 
rules, but by his Prophetic Word. It is a particular kingdom, because he has not 
given positive laws to all men, but only to a particular people, and to certain 
specific men whom he himself chose.16
The “Kingdom of God by Nature” is not obviously limited to natural laws, 
because political societies of an acquisitive and institutive kind can also 
be established there. The “naturalness” of this divine kingdom depends on 
14 Cf. C, XV.3-4, XVII.15-18; L, XXXVI.
15 Cf. L, 554-556.
16 C, 173.
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how God addresses man (in this case, through the dictates of natural rea-
son), and not certainly on being a state of nature tout court. Thus it is not 
the mutual relationship among men, but the one between God and men 
that is in a natural condition, to the extent that the precepts regarding wor-
ship and honour of God must be deduced only from natural reason, not 
from revelation (which is not given at the level of the “Kingdom of God by 
Nature”). However, the aim of natural laws on divine worship (“to render 
honour to God”) can be achieved more through the establishment of com-
mon public policies than through the persistence of private and personal 
habits, which stand necessarily in mutual contrast. In the “Kingdom of God 
by Nature” (in which God rules – if recognized – by means of His omnipo-
tence), it is up to the State to judge which attributes and rites render hon-
our to God; a sign of honour to God is all that is decided by the State, the 
sole legitimate interpreter of natural laws, which is therefore able to estab-
lish – being the sole and legitimate holder of the juridical responsibility for 
worship in front of God – a uniform worship that single individuals must 
compulsorily abide with.17
III. “Potentia Dei” in the Prophetic Kingdom of God
After the “long night” mankind spent in the darkness of atheism, super-
stition and idolatry, God led Abraham to the true religion by revealing 
Himself supernaturally to him, and making a covenant with him through 
the establishment of the sign of circumcision. In this way Hobbes opens 
chapter XVI of De cive,18 which is devoted to the Kingdom of God under the 
Old Covenant. Hobbes asks himself why God accepts to undergo a cove-
nant to obtain obedience, which was already due to Him by nature and 
recognized to Him as creator of the world?
The words “that I be your God and the God of your descendants after you” do 
not mean that Abraham satisfies this agreement merely by acknowledging the 
power and Dominion that God has over men by nature, i.e. by the general rec-
ognition of God, which is a matter of natural reason; but by the specific recog-
nition of him […]. It is certain that Abraham believed that the voice was the 
voice of God and a true revelation, and that he wanted his followers to worship 
the one who had so addressed him as God, creator of the universe; and his 
faith lay not in believing that God exists or that his promises are true (which all 
17 Cf. E, I.XI.12; C, XV.16-18, XVI.7; L, 570-572.
18 Cf. also L, XXXV, XXXVIII, XL.
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men believe), but in not doubting that the one whose voice and promises he 
had heard was God. It is also clear that God of Abraham signifies not simply 
God but God appearing to him.19
The worship that Abraham owed to God was not the worship of reason but 
the worship of religion and faith revealed supernaturally. It is no longer the 
universal God of mankind, who speaks by means of natural reason, but 
rather the particular God of Abraham, who speaks by means of a special 
revelation, through which Abraham becomes the only and legitimate inter-
preter of the law and word of God. Abraham’s descendents, the people of 
Israel, will renew the covenant with the God of Abraham20 by confirming 
their obligation to Him and, along with that, the establishment of His 
Kingdom under the Old Covenant. This latter situation is restored and 
renewed by the revelation of God to Moses on Mount Sinai through which, 
for the first time in the proper sense, the Scriptures also start to speak of 
institutive, and of not acquisitive, “kingdom”:
For although God was their [the people of Israel] king both by nature and by 
the Agreement with Abraham, they nevertheless owed him not only natural 
obedience and natural worship, as his subjects, but the religious worship 
which Abraham had instituted they owed him as subjects of Abraham, Isaac 
or Jacob, their natural Princes. For the only Word of God that they had received 
was the natural word of right reason, and there was no agreement between 
God and themselves except in so far as their wills were included in the will of 
Abraham, as their Prince. But now, by the agreement made at Mount [Sinai, a 
kingdom of God by design (institutivum) comes into being over them, as each 
individual gave his consent.21
In this case, “kingdom” has no anthropomorphic derivation (as was the 
case, on the contrary, with the expression “Kingdom of God by Nature”) 
because, in His prophetic kingdom, God is a monarch in the proper sense, 
He is endowed with sovereign power over his subjects who, by making the 
covenant, accept God as a king, and give their consent to the foundation of 
the prophetic Kingdom of God, i.e. of a civil kingdom in which God is sov-
ereign under the Old Covenant: “By the Kingdome of God is properly meant 
a Commonwealth, instituted (by the consent of those which were to be 
subject thereto) for their Civill Government”.22
While analyzing the features of the prophetic Kingdom of God, the 
Hobbesian argument refers to the theme of potentia Dei, but it does not 
19 C, 189-190.
20 Cf. C, XVI.5-8; L, XXXV.
21 C, 191-192.
22 L, 640.
300309300309 0001959248.INDD   73 2/26/2013   5:31:42 PM
74 C. Altini / Hobbes Studies  26 (2013) 65–84 
assign a primary role to it. As a matter of fact, in the chapters of De cive and 
Leviathan devoted to such analysis, discussion hinges on the relationship 
between civil and ecclesiastical power, and Hobbes tries constantly to carry 
out a reductio ad unum of the two forms of supremacy in a single sovereign-
representative person, in an attempt to avoid divisions and conflicts 
between the two instances of authority, as well as theoretically and practi-
cally implement the two philosophical-political theses on unity and indi-
visibility of sovereignty.23 While tracing back the various periods in the 
history of the Jews, as summarized in the Old Testament, Hobbes ascertains 
that civil and ecclesiastical powers have always been an exclusive privilege 
exercised by a one and single person, holder of the supreme authority to 
interpret the law and the word of God, who is allowed to decide on the 
truth of prophecies and authenticity of the prophets, as well as to establish 
regulations for the conduct of civil life everybody must obey. All the mem-
bers of the community owe a simple obedience to such a person as regards 
both religious and civil matters. For this reason, the form of government 
by right of the Jews can be defined as a “priestly kingdom” or a “royal priest-
hood”, according to whether the king or the priest had the primacy in differ-
ent historical periods. However, what did not change during all the time 
leading from Abraham to Jesus Christ was the unity and indivisibility of the 
two (civil and ecclesiastical) powers in the same function: “In God’s 
Kingdom obedience had to be given to the princes Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, 
Moses, and the Priest and the King, each in his time […]. If the King or Priest 
who held sovereign power ordered any other thing that was contrary to the 
laws, that was an offence by the older of sovereign power, not by the sub-
ject; whose duty is to carry out the orders of his superiors, not to dispute 
them”.24
The legitimate authority to legislate and constrain lies only in the func-
tion of the secular prince (whether priest or king): so, even in the prophetic 
Kingdom of God under the Old Covenant, it is clear that awarding God the 
title of king is not directly relevant, except in an anthropomorphical sense. 
While ending the section by dealing with the “prophetic Kingdom under 
the Old Covenant”, Hobbes aims to emphasize the two serious forms of 
degeneration – sometimes mutually interdependent – that undermine the 
unity of theological-political sovereignty: on the one hand, the attempts to 
separate civil and ecclesiastical power, thus generating conflicts between 
the two instances of power that may lead to proper civil wars; on the other 
23 Cf. E, II.VII; C, XVI.11-17, XVII.14-28; L, XXXIII, XXXVI-XXXVII, XXXIX-XLII.
24 C, 201-202.
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hand, the claims of single individuals for independence of judgment and 
interpretation in civil and religious matters. According to Hobbes, the Old 
Testament supplies arguments that allow avoiding both dangers.
The “prophetic Kingdom of God” refers not only to the revelation of the 
Old Testament, but also and obviously to the revelation of the New 
Testament. In this way Hobbes passes from the “Kingdom of God under 
the Old Covenant” to the “Kingdom of God by the New Covenant”.25 Jesus 
Christ was sent to mankind to restore the Kingdom of God with a new alli-
ance whose sign is baptism, i.e. a new covenant by which man agrees to 
obey the God of Abraham and believe Jesus is the Christ (whereas God 
agrees to forgive sins and open the doors of the Kingdom of Heaven). 
However, the Kingdom of God will not begin until the second coming of 
Christ on Judgment Day: “hence Christ is not yet seated in the seat of his 
Majesty”.26 The Kingdom of God by new Covenant is far from coming, as 
the time Christ spent among men does not hint at a kingdom in the proper 
sense, but rather at a regeneration or a renewal, i.e. a pastoral function. 
Until the return of Christ, the Kingdom of God is not “of this world” but “of 
another world”, because Christ was not given the authority to rule or legis-
late by God, but only to teach and advise the way and means of salvation, 
which cannot be known through natural reason:
The Regime under which Christ rules his faithful in this life is not properly 
a Kingdom, or government (imperium), but a Pastoral office or right to teach, 
i.e. God the Father has not given him authority to give judgements about mine 
and thine as he has to the Kings of the Earth, nor to compel by penalties or 
make laws, but he has given him authority to reveal to the world and to teach 
the way and the knowledge of salvation, i.e. the authority to preach and to 
explain to men what they should do to enter into the kingdom of heaven […]. 
For Christ was sent to strike an Agreement between God and men; no one is 
obliged to give obedience until after he has entered into an agreement; hence 
no one would be obliged to accept his verdict, if he had given judgement on 
questions of right. But in fact, trials of legal matters, whether between believ-
ers or unbelievers, have not been entrusted to Christ in this world. This is 
apparent from the fact that that right belongs without question to Princes, so 
long as God does not restrict their authority; and he does not do so this side of 
the day of judgement.27
The office of Christ is composed of three parts, which correspond to three 
different periods: Redeemer, Shepherd and King. The first part (Redeemer) 
25 Cf. C, XVII; L, XLI.
26 C, 207.
27 C, 208-209.
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already came true with Incarnation, in which Christ shows Himself as the 
Saviour; the second part (Shepherd) is the period in which the return of 
Christ is awaited and Christ carries out His role of master; the third part 
(King) coincides with Judgment Day and Salvation. So the kingdom of 
Christ, which corresponds to the third part of His office, is not of this world 
and, for this reason, the time of His predication “is not properly a Kingdome, 
and thereby a warrant to deny obedience to the Magistrates”,28 as it – the 
world to come – will not begin until the final resurrection. The future 
Kingdom of God will be achieved only in that moment; and it will be 
achieved on Earth: “Salvation shall be on Earth, then, when God shall reign 
(at the coming again of Christ) in Jerusalem”,29 i.e. not in a coelum empy-
reum or in the form of a “kingdom of darkness” (which implies the distinc-
tion between spiritual and temporal power).30
Discussion on divine omnipotence can be developed at three levels: the 
ontological and metaphysical dimension; the “Kingdom of God by Nature”; 
and the “prophetic Kingdom of God”. However, it never seems to play a 
founding role in Hobbes’s philosophical system. It is thus clear that Hobbes 
neutralizes God’s might at the level of both natural philosophy and civil 
philosophy. As to the role of divine omnipotence in the Kingdom of God by 
Nature, the irresistible power characterizing God in that kingdom has not 
been of this world ever since the first covenant was made with the Jews, 
God “rules” over it only in a metaphorical and figurative sense, also because 
He needs to be recognized to “rule”. As to the actual relevance of potentia 
Dei in the prophetic Kingdom of God, divine intervention in the world is 
excluded not only by the form of the covenant, but even by the content 
itself, which postpones the coming of the Kingdom of God to Judgment 
Day. Moreover, Hobbes denies the presence of divine laws in the Kingdom 
of God after earthly life.31 So we do not find any trace of divine omnipo-
tence in the actual order of the world. Not by chance Hobbes can afford to 
say: “For God truly reigns where the laws are obeyed for fear of God, not of 
men. And if men were as they should be, that would be the best form of 
commonwealth. But to rule men as they are, there must be power (poten-
tia) (which comprises both right and strength) to compel”.32 This power to 
28 L, 776.
29 L, 722-724.
30 Cf. L, 710-728.
31 Cf. C, XVII.8.
32 C, 198.
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constrain, the only actual one, is ascribed to the sovereign-representative 
person, not to God.
IV. The Reduction of “Potentia” to “Potestas” in Political Philosophy
In Hobbes’s political philosophy, the personalistic element is a trait which is 
highly typical of sovereignty.33 However, it is not the only one. In fact, the 
element of political mechanism is also widely recognised.34 It is no coinci-
dence, then, that Carl Schmitt speaks of the Hobbesian oscillation between 
decisionism and positivism. Therefore a contrast emerges between two dif-
ferent concepts of the exercise of sovereign power, one absolute and the 
other ordinate (the theoretical root of which can be traced back to the 
Medieval distinction between potentia absoluta Dei and potentia ordinata 
Dei elaborated principally by Ockham and Duns Scotus). On the one hand, 
we have a concept of a sovereign who exercises ordinate power, in other 
words “mechanically”, his own power adhering to the criteria of positive 
law which he himself has created. On the other hand, we have a concept of 
a sovereign who exercises his own absolute power, suspending, in accor-
dance with his own wishes, the validity of positive law, which he himself 
has created. In this second instance, the civil person, that is the sovereign-
representative person, is absolute in the sense that he is able to go beyond 
the totality of positive laws, but, at the same time, the positive laws are the 
instrument through which the potestas of the State reaches, ordinate, 
the peak of its own potentia. This parallelism between potentia Dei and the 
power of the civil person in no way implies an acceptance of the theory of 
secularisation: the Hobbesian State is the result of human intellect and of 
human creative ability, and it has it origin only in the pact (pactum unionis), 
which was conceived in an individualistic manner. Such an individualistic 
or atomistic foundation does not imply the ideal of a sovereign-representa-
tive persona, but, rather, the image of the Leviathan as a machina.35 What 
matters in the Hobbesian State is not representation through a person, 
but the factual and real provision of effective protection (“protection in 
exchange for obedience”, Carl Schmitt notes in Der Begriff des “Politischen”), 
33 Cf. C, II.4-8, V.6-12, VI.3-11, XII.4, XIV.1-3; L, XVI-XVIII.
34 Cf. C, VI.19; L, Introduction and XXI, XXVI, XXIX.
35 Cf. L, 16-18, 324-328, 344, 396, 458, 496-498, 510-512, 518, 540.
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which can be ensured only by an effectively working command mecha-
nism. This technical character, the concept of machina machinarum, is 
therefore the specific characteristic of the Modern State, which derives 
from Hobbes. Thus, personalism is at the service of mechanism and not the 
other way round. Within this technical-artificial dimension of the State, the 
legal system performs a central role, above all as the instrument through 
which laws are transformed into positive commands.36 The State functions 
as a coercive mechanism which, through the public proclamation of laws, 
activates justifications of a psychological order, through which the citizen’s 
will can be more directly disposed to obeying whoever equally holds 
power and might:
For he who has been granted by right [iure] all the power needed to coerce any 
number of citizens by penalties, has as much power [potentiam] as the citi-
zens can confer upon him. It is evident therefore that in every commonwealth 
there is some one man or one assembly [concilium] or council [curia], which 
has by right as much power [potentia] over individual citizens as each man has 
over himself outside of the commonwealth, that is, sovereign or absolute 
power [potentia], which is to be limited only by strength of the common-
wealth and not by anything else. For if its power [potestas] is to be limited, it 
has to be by a greater power [potestas]; for the one that sets the limits must 
have greater power [potentia] than the one restrained by limits. The restrain-
ing power [potentia] therefore is either without limit, or is restrained in its 
turn by a greater power [potentia]; and so it will come down at least to a power 
[potestas] without other limit than that set by the strength of all the citizens 
together in its full extent. This is the so-called sovereign power [imperium 
summum].37
In Hobbes’s sovereign-representative person, power and might are con-
fused, without a meaningful conceptual distinction between them, so 
much so that on more than one occasion Hobbes uses potentia, potestas 
and imperium ‘interchangeably’:38 “For the power [potentia] of the citizens 
is the power [potentia] of the commonwealth, that is, his power who holds 
the sovereignty [imperium] in the commonwealth”.39 If potestas is the 
36 Cf. L, XXVI.
37 C, VI.17-18, 88.
38 Cf. C, V.11, VII.3, VII.11-12, VIII.10. Hobbes does not make a clear distinction between 
potentia and potestas, between power and might, terms which he often ‘confuses’ and uses in 
ambiguous and interchangeable ways: cf. E, II.3-4; L, X (with differences between English 
Works and Opera Latina); Cor., X.1; An Answer to Bishop Bramhall’s Book, called “The Catching 
of the Leviathan”, in The English Works, ed. by W. Molesworth, London, John Bohn, 1839-1845, 
vol. IV, 298.
39 C, 143.
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equivalent of imperium, then potestas designates the right to command by 
whoever has the most potentia.
Clearly, Hobbes’s political mechanism of the State is directly related to 
the new scientific paradigm asserted by Galileo Galilei. The Hobbesian 
State must function with mathematical exactness and geometrical preci-
sion. However, exactness in the political field means something completely 
different when compared to exactness in the field of mathematics and 
geometry. Indeed, mathematics and geometry – unlike politics – are 
untouched by passions and opinions. In this situation, also, the Leviathan 
State finds itself radically reduced to technology. The task of the sovereign-
representative person is to develop techniques that are useful for an 
effective conservation and running of the State. It is clear that all this pre-
supposes a prior restriction of the political arena, in other words, the 
restriction of the fundamental questions concerning the purpose of the 
State to a single condition: the State’s role as a guarantor of peace and secu-
rity. When faced with this compact mechanism which creates and regulates 
the political order, it is legitimate to ask: does it really make sense to talk 
of the potentia (or omnipotence) of the State? Are potentia and potestas 
really the same thing for Hobbes?
With regard to the might of the State, it is right to speak of omnipotence 
in a wider sense, even though it is nonetheless relative. The State is omnipo-
tent in that it is the foremost power before which nothing – neither “from 
below” (the citizens), nor from “on high” (God) – can offer any effective 
resistance. However, no State is omnipotent, neither at a theoretical nor at 
a practical level. First and foremost it is necessary to consider, at least in 
theory, the possibility that exonerates the citizen from political obedience: 
however small, his right to resist is legitimate.40 Secondly, the sovereign-
representative person has to respect – at the level of his own juridical legiti-
macy, and even in the absence of effective sanctions – the dictates of natural 
law.41 Finally, within an international context, each State is confronted by 
other States, whose sovereignty is equally legitimate.42 Thus, to take it to 
its absurd conclusion, the Hobbesian State is hypothetically omnipotent 
only when all rights of resistance and every reference to natural law 
have been eliminated, and, lastly, once the effective conditions for a world-
wide State have been achieved. Clearly, then, the achievement of the con-
ditions required by Hobbesian theory is entirely improbable, as well as 
40 Cf. E, II.II.12-16; C, VII.18; L, XXI, XXVII.
41 Cf. E, II.IX; C, XIII; L, XXX.
42 Cf. L, 552.
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theoretically unjustifiable. In speaking of the omnipotence of the Hobbes-
ian State, we are talking about a relative omnipotence, as opposed to one 
which is absolute.43
However, this does not imply a denial that the English philosopher indi-
cates the way forward for a progressive linguistic and conceptual ‘coinci-
dence’ of potentia and potestas. In Hobbesian political philosophy this 
ambiguity is intrinsic, or structural, and it is not restricted only to the rela-
tionship between conceptual analysis and terminology (in other words, the 
Hobbesian ‘confusion’ between potentia and potestas, might and power). 
The creation of the Hobbesian State can only be completed when potentia 
and potestas coincide. The State is the highest and noblest realisation of 
man’s potentia, in the form of potestas. The State is man’s greatest work of 
art, the most important creation of human genius: it is the only historical-
concrete form through which human potential can be realised. The State, 
therefore, presents itself as an act of human might, as the single legitimate 
and effective achievement of human ability. As such, the State is – at one 
and the same time – the pre-eminent legitimate power that can be realised, 
the strongest coercive force and the highest legal authority (potestas, impe-
rium, auctoritas), because it is the most extraordinary realisation of human 
might. For this reason, in Hobbesian theory, potentia and potestas are both 
intelligible in opposition to the difficulties which arise with the actus:44 “It 
is unthinkable that a man or assembly which has direct and immediate 
power [in potentia proxima & immediata] of action should hold power 
[imperium] in such a way that it cannot actually give any commands; for 
power [imperium] is simply the right to give commands whenever it is pos-
sible by nature”.45
The act (that is, the State) is that which univocally and legitimately comes 
into existence as a result of the coincidence of power and might; without 
the presence of either of these two elements, the act – the State – fails to 
come about. For the sovereign-representative person, the possibility of 
exercising acts of command is essential: power and might, together, express 
the conditions for the possibility of exercising such acts, independently of 
whether these can effectively be carried out. Moreover, we do not know the 
content of such acts and, in any case, this does not affect their potential to 
come about. Misery and nobility, advantages and disadvantages in the 
action of the State are excluded from the concept of potentia understood as 
43 Cf. C, XIV.1, XVI.15; L, X.
44 Cf. C, VII.11-13 and VII.16, X.16.
45 C, 99.
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potestas: “For government [imperium] is a capacity [potentia], administra-
tion of government is an act [actus]; power [potentia] is equal in every kind 
of commonwealth; what differs are acts [actus], i.e. the motions and actions 
of the commonwealth”.46 Potentia is that which the sovereign-representa-
tive person is able to do in that he has the capacity to do it; whereas potestas 
is that which the sovereign-representative person is able to do in that he 
has the legitimacy to do it. The content of the actus is irrelevant to Hobbes’s 
theory of sovereignty. How, then, can men protest against that which is the 
highest realisation of their own ability and potential? How can a man deny 
the right of the greatest product of his own intelligence and creativity? Man 
must be prepared to hand over his own potentia to allow it to be developed 
by the State as potestas and, therefore, as actus, without which the condi-
tions for the fulfilment of his true abilities cannot exist. Man can fulfil him-
self completely (and his own well-being) only when the conditions for 
peace and security exist. Without potestas, there can be no potentia and, 
therefore, no actus. Without potentia, there can be no potestas and, there-
fore, no actus. Thus, there is only one way for potentia to become actus, 
which is by way of potestas created by man himself.
The nature of the relationship between potentia and potestas in Hobbes 
indicates the absence of a concept of potentia understood as possibility and 
faculty, as well as readiness to hand and openness. The English philosopher 
shows the legitimate way to justify the realisation of human potentia in 
terms of potestas created by man and for man’s benefit. Hobbes, however, 
does not discuss the ends to which the potentia-potestas should be directed. 
Man possesses a high level of potentia which, in the state of nature, remains 
completely ineffective. In this situation, it is necessary to provide a theo-
retical mechanism with which man can autonomously construct a potestas 
which is able to provide the conditions for the realisation of his own 
potentia. The resultant institution (the State) is essential for this process of 
creating potentia-potestas, rather than its end, understood as substantial 
content. In Hobbes, the actus is a product that has a “formal” value, because 
it creates the conditions for the effective realisation of human potentia 
through the mechanism of potestas. However, in Hobbesian theory the 
ends to which the realisation of potentia must be channelled are totally 
irrelevant. Therefore, it is indifference with regard to the substantial con-
tent of the actus – rather than questions of the amount of power, in other 
words omnipotence – which influences the Hobbesian interpretation of 
46 C, 125.
300309300309 0001959248.INDD   81 2/26/2013   5:31:43 PM
82 C. Altini / Hobbes Studies  26 (2013) 65–84 
potentia in terms of potestas. It is not by accident, then, that the question of 
the might of the sovereign-representative person is not expressed by 
Hobbes in terms of omnipotence. The neutrality of potentia-potestas can-
not enter into discussion of the goals of actus. On the one hand, then, the 
discussion of the actus is superseded by the theory of potentia: what counts 
is the possession of the capacity to act, independently of the goals to which 
it is directed. On the other hand, the discussion of the actus is substituted 
by the theory of potestas: what counts is the legitimacy of the capacity to 
act, independently of the forms of its concrete use. The goal of Hobbesian 
political philosophy (the search for peace and security) necessitates the 
reduction of potentia to potestas through the elimination of the question 
of the actus.
V. Determinism and Power: “Potentia” as Cause in Natural Philosophy
Hobbes was no fan of the idea of potentia. Nothing in his work, if correctly 
understood in the light of his complete philosophical system, aims at creat-
ing a justification for omnipotence. This is true with respect to both the 
ethical-political and the metaphysical-theological levels. Even the fact that 
the Hobbesian God is practically, if not nominally, “impotent” is proof of 
this: His power is ineffectual at a political level, given that it plays no sub-
stantial role in the Kingdom of God by its own nature, nor in the “prophetic 
kingdom of God”.47 Moreover, God’s might is even ineffectual at the level of 
physics, given that this is restricted to His prescience: God’s intervention in 
the world is strictly tied to the eternal laws of causal determinism inherent 
in its true reality, i.e. the bodies in motion.48 The faults in the mechanism of 
justification of potentia-potestas can be traced even at the level of Hobbes’s 
political philosophy. Similar considerations also apply to the arguments 
that Hobbes uses at an anthropological level. Indeed, the fundamentally 
obscure and miserable condition of man in the state of nature is immedi-
ately apparent, for although it is one in which everyone nominally enjoys 
freedom and absolute power, this proves to be totally inadequate for self-
preservation. On the other hand, human power is dangerous at the level of 
practical consequences (the war of all against all): where everyone has 
power, no one has power. Moreover, all traces of man’s ineffectual power 
47 Cf. C, XV-XVII; L, XXXI, XXXIV-XXXVIII.
48 Cf. E, I.XI; LN, 19-21, 40-42; Cor., VIII.20, IX.7, XXVI.1.
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are lost in the civil State; it is, therefore, useful and “productive” (that is 
effective) only when it is transferred. Lastly, the justification of the most 
important instrument which is able to develop the power of man, i.e. sci-
ence, is shown to be both problematic and ambiguous. Despite being the 
most effective instrument for strengthening human power, science also 
risks re-involving man in mutual conflict, given that it can produce pas-
sions connected with the recognition of the desire for superiority, which 
has the potential to destroy peace. It is therefore clear that a thinker who 
tends to ‘empty’ the idea of power of its contents cannot be labelled as the 
standard bearer of omnipotence tout court.
However, leaving aside the issue that Hobbes may have wanted to avoid 
‘filling’ the idea of power with more specific contents, it remains undeni-
able that Hobbes himself was one of the first theorists to initiate – from a 
formal and argumentative point of view – the modern reduction of poten-
tia to potestas, above all in linguistic terms. This linguistic slippage is clear 
especially with regard to the determinism of his theory of physics. Hobbes’s 
wish to free himself of the weight of the Aristotelian-Scholastic legacy, 
especially where the idea of might - one of the key concepts in the teleo-
logical tradition of physics – is concerned, is thoroughly understandable. 
Hobbes’s physical mechanism brings to completion the parallelism 
between cause and effect on the one hand, and might and act on the other. 
This contributes to the exclusion of the idea of potentia from the semantic 
field, which is related to the concepts of possibility, faculty and potentiality, 
and reduces it to an idea of potestas which is mechanically determined in 
the relationship between cause and effect. Potentia correspond to cause 
and actus correspond to effect.
When any agent has all the accidents necessarily required by the agent itself to 
produce an effect on any patient, then we say that agent can produce that 
effect, if it is applied to the patient. Yet we showed that the accidents make up 
the efficient cause: so, the very same accidents make up both the efficient 
cause and the agent’s potentia. Therefore the agent’s potentia and the effi-
cient  cause are actually the same, but they are considered different as to a 
point: we say cause with reference to the effect which has been already pro-
duced and we say potentia with reference to the same effect which still has to be 
produced, so that the cause relates to the past and potentia relates to the future 
[…]. However they are considered in a different way, since we look to the past 
for the cause and to the future for potentia. Therefore both the agent’s and the 
patient’s potentia, which can also be called entire potentia, is the same as the 
entire cause […]. Finally, if the produced accident is called effect with refer-
ence to the cause, then it will be called actus with reference to potentia. As an 
effect is produced at the very moment in which the cause is entire, potentia 
produces likewise the actus it can produce at the very moment in which it is 
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entire. As no effect can arise otherwise than being produced by a sufficient and 
necessary cause, similarly no actus is produced otherwise than being pro-
duced by a sufficient potentia, that could not but produce it.49
It is the deterministic theory of events – and not merely an absolutist 
option regarding the theory of State or a re-elaboration in modern terms of 
the medieval concept of potentia Dei – which draws the interpretative 
background against which Hobbes works out the idea of potentia-potestas. 
Only a temporal difference (a cause corresponds to an effect in the past, 
while might corresponds to an act in the future), available exclusively at the 
linguistic level, distinguishes cause from might. This difference, however, 
can only be perceived at the human level, given that in itself – on an onto-
logical level – it is absolutely irrelevant. Cause and might are the same 
because might – where it exists– is not a possibility but a necessity: potentia 
thus loses its root posse to come together with the idea of necessity. The 
possible is what is necessary, otherwise it does not exist. It is no accident 
that future events are contingent only for man, due to his lack of knowl-
edge, but in themselves, they are necessary for the very reason that they 
have necessary causes, in exactly the same way as past events. Therefore, in 
reality, might does not exist conditionally; it cannot not exist, otherwise it 
simply would not be: “The actus, which exists, is a necessary actus; what-
ever actus there will be, it will be by matter of necessity”.50 There is no mid-
dle position between not-being and being: might and act are no longer 
ways of being, but only belong to the realm of representation. For this rea-
son, it becomes substantially impossible to distinguish between active 
might and the efficient cause, between passive might and material cause, 
between a plenary might and entire cause, or between act and effect. At this 
point it is not difficult to see the slippage of the idea of might towards the 
semantic field delimited by the idea of power. Might does not indicate that 
which has the possibility of becoming, but is that which has the power of 
becoming. A power which, indeed, implies the necessity of becoming. No 
act can exist unless it is produced by a plenary might, in other words an 
entire cause; and, if the cause is entire, that is, if the might is plenary, it can-
not fail to produce an act.51 Potentia is, necessarily, potestas, otherwise it 
does not exist.
49 Cor., X.1-2.
50 Cor., X.5.
51 Cf. Cor., IX.3-5.
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